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Abstract
In the ongoing War on Terror, the Obama Administration has relied heavily on a
new form of military technology: the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, more popularly known
as the drone. While the program has remained largely a covert operation, gradually more
information about its effects, especially concerning civilian casualties, has begun to come
to light. As a result of allegations over their allegedly indiscriminate use in Yemen and
Pakistan, countries the U.S. is not at war with, a few questions arise. When do drones
stop becoming a military precision tool for taking out Al-Qaeda senior command and
move into a field of unchecked and rapidly proliferating military assassinations of
terrorists and civilians alike? Have they crossed that line, and if so, are the actions of the
United States legal under international law? In examining these key thoughts, the
effectiveness and ultimately, alternatives to the Drone Doctrine must also be judged.
This report finds that the drone program has become counterproductive and
should be stopped. The indiscriminate killings of civilians are in violation of International
Human Rights Laws and have caused an environment where to continue drone strikes
will only result in a permanently damaged relationship with the people of Yemen and
Pakistan. The only way to carry out a successful drone program is to have it in the open,
overseen by the international community. Even when that happens, drones are not a
complete counterterrorism strategy. Other methods for building infrastructure and state
empowerment must be used in conjunction with drones to stop terrorism and violence at
their roots.
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Preface
“We should all be clear that there is no trade-off between effective action against
terrorism and protection of human rights. On the contrary, I believe that in the long term,
we shall find that human rights, along with democracy and social justice, are one of the
best prophylactics against terrorism.”
-Kofi Annan1
“As part of our fact-finding mission in the investigation of this attack, we sought to
obtain testimony directly from the eyewitnesses themselves. With the help of the victims'
families, we managed to meet the wounded and record their testimony. Burns, swelling,
and pyoderma, especially on their faces and limbs, were so severe that it was difficult to
recognize the missile shrapnel that remained embedded in their bodies.”
-HOOD2
“The use of force must be seen as part of a larger discussion we need to have about a
comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, because for all the focus on the use of force,
force alone cannot make us safe”
-Barack Obama3
The new face of war is chillingly faceless. In operations across remote areas of
Pakistan and Yemen, Unmanned Aerial Combat Vehicles (UACV) emanate a loud noise,
a constant reminder that death is near and can be instantaneous. In these areas steeped
with danger and terrorist influence, even an operation as well planned as the one that
killed Osama Bin Laden can prove disastrous. The risk of putting boots on the ground
seems too great to the United States, unwilling to slide back into another Iraq or
Afghanistan. Instead, the drone has become the weapon of choice, the centerpiece of the
Obama counterterrorism policy. They are a precision weapon, a mechanized killing
system, and an intelligence breakthrough. From behind one, they are a godsend. From
beneath one, they are an angel of death. Drones are the future of warfare, a future that
still has the potential to be either miraculous or terrifying.

1

Mary Robinson, “Human Rights Are as Important as Ever,” International Herald Tribune. Jun. 21, 2002.
“This is the Year of Drones and Terror Security Forces,” HOOD. May 28, 2013.
3 “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University,” Whitehouse.gov. May 23, 2013.
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Introduction
This study was undertaken on two different levels: through academic research in
explanations of International Humanitarian Law, transnationality, and counterterrorism
policy as well as through personal interviews with experts in the field. The two different
methods worked complimentarily, with prior research giving breadth to intelligent
questions for interviews, which lead to discussions much more nuanced and broaderreaching than most written reports. In gaining a broader and more well rounded view
through interviews, more research could be done on new, specific aspects that had been
brought up.
Much of the literature referenced in this report was produced by humanitarian
non-governmental organizations including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch,
Al Karama, and the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies on the affects of targeted killing
in Pakistan and Yemen. It is interesting to note that most of these repots came out within
a week of each other at the end of October, 2013, which was timed rather conveniently
for use in this project. The majority of the data used for numbers of attacks and casualties
were taken from these reports, as they provide more information than the statistics
officially released by the U.S. government. Other literature used were reports published
in international law journals on the legality of targeted killing, and many were written by,
contributed to, or recommended to me by the experts I interviewed. The most heavily
used in this report was a report written by Nils Melzer to the E.U. Parliament on drones
and targeted killing. Also heavily referenced is a case study published in The Atlantic by
Mark Bowden, author of Black Hawk Down, explaining the benefits and problems with
drones.
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Using these first sources, I formulated questions for interviews that allowed for
in-depth answers that could be further researched. I explained to my interviewees my
personal opinion that drones are an effective tool of warfare that are here to stay, but the
way in which they are currently being used is unsustainable. From there, I asked about
legal frameworks they thought would apply, the threat of proliferation, the idea that
drones are now counterproductive, alternatives to military action, mechanisms for
accountability, and what can be done internationally to change the current policy of the
U.S.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the situations in both Pakistan and Yemen to
determine the legality of the U.S. use of drones. In doing so, it can be seen that a military
response covers only some of the issues that are at the root of terrorism in these countries.
It has therefore reached a point where regardless of the legality of the strikes, they have
become counterproductive and alternatives should be employed. A combination of the
way the U.S. has used drones in these places coupled with the current political situations
have made drones a counterproductive policy that should be readjusted. Transparency
from the governments of the U.S., Yemen, and Pakistan as well as with the number of
casualties should be a priority. Following, mechanisms for accountability and
international oversight ought to be put into place to avoid any further situations where
drones have to be stopped because of misuse. Drones are seen in Yemen and Pakistan as
a harbinger of destruction and death. That does not have to be their reality. By making
adjustments, the drone can continue to be useful for fighting counterterrorism, but only
with restraint and alongside other social policies and reforms that cut to the roots of
terrorism instead of only their most visible results.
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Changing International Reality
One of the main reasons behind the debate over the use of drones is the changing
nature of warfare itself. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world experienced a
meltdown of the Cold War reality, where international relations would happen in terms of
unified and largely predictable blocks.4 The current state of global affairs is much
different from the world that the pre-existing laws of warfare were written in. No longer
do conflicts simply happen internally or between state actors, in fact, most wars and
especially those where drones are heavily featured, are between states and non-state actor
groups.
One issue that has given rise to this is the proliferation of failed and failing states
where governments are not strong enough to retain complete control over their territories.
In these situations, political vacuums take over and allow for the rise of non-state actors
to gain control often through violent means. When these situations arise, as they have in
the cases of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and even Lebanon to an extent, it
becomes increasingly difficult to monitor and control the movement of people, money,
and goods, as well as to enforce and regulate overlapping legal frameworks and
jurisdictions that result from non-state actors.5
This presents a challenge to international jurisdiction because though the basic
laws of war should imply in theory, non-state actors were not party to agreements and
therefore feel no obligation to follow them.6 The lack of accountability and structure of
these groups also makes it difficult to target, punish, and negotiate with them when

4

Mohammad-Mahmoud Mohamedou, interview by author, November 7, 2013.
Andrea J. Dew, Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, “Empowered Groups, Tested Laws, and
Policy Options” Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University, 2007.
6 David Atwood, interview by author, October 31, 2013.
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necessary.7 It is due to this unconventionality that these new and also unconventional
methods for engaging non-state actors have arisen. The United States’ War on Terror is
not against an organized and unified movement. Instead, the U.S. faces an enemy that
they increasingly do not understand in an area out of control of traditional government.
None of this serves as a justification for the use of drones, but instead provides a context
for why the international laws of war may have to be reassessed in light of new enemies
and new weapons. In this view, laws must either constantly adapt to new technology8, or
interpretations must be bold, rapid, and correct in order to keep technology from running
free from jurisdiction.
History of Drones
The first thing to establish is that the drones themselves are not unconventional.
Since the First and Second World Wars, the United States and the United Kingdom have
been using unmanned aircraft to deploy bombs on enemies. The difference now is the
range and accuracy with which these weapons operate.9 As opposed to the indiscriminate
bombings of B-24’s that characterized the Second World War in the bombings of
Coventry and Dresden, the current drones have the ability of surveillance to aid their
attacks.10 Although the methods for surveillance have also greatly improved, using
cameras on planes has been in use since the Vietnam War.11 So then what is it that is so
unsettling about the newest incarnations of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles?

7

Andrea J. Dew, Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, “Empowered Groups, Tested Laws, and
Policy Options” Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University, 2007.
8 Marc Finaud, Interview with Author, November 5, 2013.
9 Michel Veuthey, in Interview with Author, October 31, 2013.
10 Mark Bowden, “How the Predator Drone Changed the Character of War,” Smithsonian Magazine,
November 2013.
11 Ibid.
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The U.S. currently uses two types of unmanned aircraft, the Predator and the
Reaper. The Predator was first used in 2000 in missions aimed at locating Osama Bin
Laden following the attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa in 1997.12 The Predator drone
was developed for surveillance, with a 60-mile panorama13 available from the plane that
can stay airborne for anywhere from 19-40 hours without refueling.14 After September
11, the demand for a military reaction prompted Hellfire missiles to be attached to the
Predator. This became the Predator’s larger incarnation: the Predator B, known as the
Reaper, which can carry twice as many missiles as its predecessor as well as two laserguided bombs.15 Whereas the Predator is equipped largely for surveillance, there is no
mistaking the purpose of the Reaper. The Reaper has advanced infrared sensors, radars,
and cameras for detection all for the larger purpose of attack. Reapers have been active in
Afghanistan since 2007.16 Because of its increased weight, the Reaper has less airtime
than the Predator, though its increased speed still allows for more long-range missions.17
The biggest innovation in both the Predator and the Reaper from their 20th century
incarnations is their global communications systems, which allowed for the UAV’s to be
piloted from anywhere in the world.18 The data link in drones allows for cheap, constant,
real-time surveillance on suspected targets. The American drones’ satellite links and data
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Mark Bowden, “How the Predator Drone Changed the Character of War,” Smithsonian Magazine,
November 2013.
13 Ibid.
14 Thomas Michael McDonnell, “Sow what you reap? Using predator and reaper drones to carry out
assasinations or targeted killings of suspected Islamic terrorists,” George Washington International Law
Review 44, no. 2 (2012).
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Mark Bowden, “The Killing Machines,” The Atlantic. Aug. 2013.
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processors are what provide their technological strength,19 making it difficult for any
other country to currently develop a rival system.20
Technological shortcomings within the two main drone models are still to be
expected in this early phase of their widespread use. Because of their absolute reliance on
communication with the ground, if a worm is inserted, a drone can be corrupted.21 If this
happens, and the encryption of a drone is broken, it can be taken over by an enemy.22
There has been one report of a drone malfunctioning over Afghanistan in 2009, sending
the $13 million aircraft into neighboring Tajikistan.23 It is unclear the reason for its
malfunction. There have already been reports of crashed drones and other aircraft
recovered and reassembled by states like Iran as early as 2011.24 The key component
though, the intelligence capabilities, are not available in Iran, rendering the recovered
aircraft little more than an overgrown remote-controlled Christmas toy.25 This may not be
cause for immediate concern, but should give pause as to the infallibility of technology.
Even with these potential breakdowns, the actual Predator and Reaper are not to
fear compared with the aircraft that are in line to follow. The next generation of
unmanned weapons will be autonomous, with multiple projects in the works to posses the
ability to carry out attacks without human command. This is referred to as man-out-ofthe-loop technology and carries with it a much weightier implication of violation of

19

Mark Bowden, “The Killing Machines,” The Atlantic. Aug. 2013.
Michel Veuthey, in Interview with Author, October 31, 2013.
21
Oceane Zubeldia, Interview with author, October 31, 2013.
22
Ibid.
23
C. J. Chivers, Carlotta Gall, and Andrew W. Lehren, “View Is Bleaker Than Official Portrayal of War in
Afghanistan,” The New York Times. (New York, New York). Jul. 25, 2010.
24
Greg Miller, “Drone belonged to CIA, officials say,” Washington Post. (Washington D.C.) Dec. 6, 2011.
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Thom Shanker, “Simple, Low-Cost Surveillance Drones Provide Advantage for U.S. Military” The New
York Times. Jan. 24, 2013.
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existing international laws of war.26 Although the full development of such weapons may
still be a ways off until they are acceptably functional,27 a strong reaction to the current
use of unmanned drones can lend itself to better precedents and mechanisms for control
for weapons to come. To explore just what those mechanisms are or should be, it is
necessary to look at the drone policy in place for the country currently leading by
example--the United States.
Obama’s Drone Doctrine
The official decision of the United States to undertake drones as a methodology
for targeted killing begun under George W. Bush with the attack in Yemen in 2002.
During both of his terms, President Bush authorized no more than 50 drone strikes.28 In
the past 4 years, President Barack Obama has signed off on over 400.29 In 2008, there
were 35 attacks, in 2009, 53, in 2010, 117 all in Pakistan alone.30 In that time, The New
America Foundation reported that 3,300 jihadist operatives were killed in Pakistan,
including over 50 senior officers.31 Important to note is that these numbers are widely
disputed, but best represent the argument for the use of drones.
The rise and relative military success of drones represents the shifting global
dimension as well as the rapid rise of technology.32 Drones give the authority of the
President and a select few including John Brennan, former adviser on Counterterrorism

26

Nils Melzer, “Human Rights Implications of the Usage of Drones and Unmanned Robots in Warfare,”
Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, as Requested by the European Parliament. May
2013.
27 Ibid.
28 Daniel Byman, “Why Drones Work,” Foreign Affairs, Jul/Aug2013, Vol. 92 Issue 4.
29 Ibid.
30 Bill Roggio and Alexander Mayer, “Charting the data for US airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004-2013,” The
Long War Journal. Accessed Nov. 19, 2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php.
31 Daniel Byman, “Why Drones Work,” Foreign Affairs, Jul/Aug2013, Vol. 92 Issue 4.
32 Mohammad-Mahmoud Mohamedou, interview by author, November 7, 2013.
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and current head of the CIA, the power to curate a list of suspected terrorist operatives to
hunt down and kill individually.33 The list consists of three levels: high value targets,
imminent threats, and signature strikes.34 High value targets are defined as high-level AlQaeda operatives. Imminent threats include examples like a truck of bombs moving
towards the Afghan border.35 Signature strikes are the most controversial, defined as
attacks on suspicious activities in enemy territory.36 In this practice, all male casualties
deemed to be militant-aged are counted as combatant casualties for official numbers.37
The meetings for determining the “kill list” are often highly contentious and
include representatives from the Pentagon, CIA, State Department, National
Counterterrorism Center, and occasionally the Justice Department.38 The criterion for
determining who was on the list is threefold.39 First, the legality needs to be affirmed by
assuring that the target is partaking in terrorist activities.40 Second, the person must be
deemed to be carrying out an action that constitutes an imminent threat to the United
States.41 Third, it must be deemed that capture is not possible and there is near certainty

33

Jo Becker and Scott Shane, “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will,” The New
York Times, (New York, New York), May 29, 2012.
34 Mark Bowden, “The Killing Machines,” The Atlantic. Aug. 2013.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Nils Melzer, “Human Rights Implications of the Usage of Drones and Unmanned Robots in Warfare,”
Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, as Requested by the European Parliament. May
2013.
38 Ibid.
39 “Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations
Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilites,” whitehouse.gov, May 23, 2013.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-us-policy-standards-and-proceduresuse-force-counterterrorism.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.

14

15
of no civilian casualties.42 Who makes the final decision whether or not someone can be
targeted is unclear.
The precedent for this practice under the Obama administration was put into place
directly after the Sept. 11 attacks, with the Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF).
AUMF was approved on Sept. 14, 2001 and allows all “necessary and appropriate force”
against those operatives who planned the attack as well as those helping to harbor them.43
Whether or not AUMF still applies is a legal question, and its legitimacy is one that even
the President himself doubts,44 but certainly the power the act granted to the president
himself was unprecedented. The direct involvement of the President of a major world
power to handpick individuals to kill, on paper, sounds like a prudent and controlled
alternative to war. Controversy comes in with the secrecy with which this process is
taking place and the lack of oversight the U.S. government has over it as well as the
amount of information released publicly.45 That and, of course, whether or not the
president should have this authority in the first place.
The Drone Doctrine is not the same across the board for all countries it currently
operates in the jurisdiction of. Examples of drone use in Libya and Afghanistan are much
different than those carried out in Yemen and Pakistan, where it is unclear whether or not
they have legal permission to operate. Besides that, because of the secrecy with which
drones are used in Yemen and Pakistan, it is difficult to assess the extent and details that
differentiate the two. What is known is that the use in Pakistan is almost all under the

42

Ibid.
“107th Congress Public Law 40” Sept. 18, 2001. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW107publ40/html/PLAW-107publ40.htm
44 “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University,” Whitehouse.gov. May 23, 2013.
45 Mark Bowden, “The Killing Machines,” The Atlantic. Aug. 2013.
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control of the CIA.46 In Yemen, however, strikes are conducted by the CIA as well as the
U.S. Navy.47 There is also cooperation with Saudi Arabia for the training of troops,
though again, the extent of their involvement with drones is unsure.48 This is important,
because even with the limited information available, some judgments can be made as far
as the status of combatants, state of conflict, and ultimately, the actual legality of U.S.
drone strikes in these two countries. It is doubly important to note the information that is
necessary to make complete judgments on how drone programs should look going into
the future.
Existing Legal Frameworks
To understand how this shift in global politics affects the regulation of drones, it
is important to understand the legal frameworks that do already exist. The first body of
law to be considered is International Humanitarian Law, or the laws of war that are
focused on protecting civilians in conflict zones.49 To a certain extent, civilian death is
unavoidable in times of conflict. In order to minimize the harm done, IHL has worked to
established guidelines of when and how civilian casualties are acceptable. Attacks are
illegal which target civilians, do not discriminate between civilians and combatants, or
cause civilian loss that is excessive compared to the anticipated military gain.50
The question then becomes, how do transnational terrorist organizations like AlQaeda fit into this description? It is obvious that, by definition, terrorist organizations are
in direct violation of these rules and therefore should have to endure international
46

“License to Kill: Why the American Drone War on Yemen Violates International Law,” Al Karama.
October 17, 2013.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 “International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: Similarities and Differences,”
International Committee of the Red Cross. Accessed Nov. 18, 2013.
50 “Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda” Human Rights Watch. October 2013.
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retribution. Because of the current lack of organization in the current incarnations of AlQaeda and its affiliates, it is nearly impossible to capture one figurehead and bring them
to justice, or have the organization make monetary reparations as has been the traditional
route of dealing with war crimes. The rise of such groups, as discussed earlier, happened
much after the original rules and conventions of IHL were written. That does not
necessarily mean the rules are outdated, instead, the vague language allows for more
interpretation over time in action. What is important now is how new thinking is applied
in the actions taken internationally to the challenges presented by both Al-Qaeda and the
U.S.’s continued use of drones against them.
Under the Geneva Conventions, Al-Qaeda operates as a sort of Fourth Generation
Warfare. This is a new development in the latter part of the twentieth century that is
characterized by a much weaker opponent utilizing tactics that are in clear violation of
IHL against much stronger opponents.51 This creates a vastly asymmetrical style of
warfare, with the advent of technology tilting this balance even more. However, it is
important to note that these groups utilizing Fourth Generation Warfare can defeat their
stronger opponents because of their violations of IHL, specific to low-cost, high-impact
attacks against civilians.52 Although there are extraordinary manners used by Al-Qaeda
and the Taliban in their terror attacks, there is no precedent yet for an extraordinary
response. Instead, IHL should remain in place and reciprocating stronger states like the
U.S. should better harness their technological advances for military victory. Here, a
correct usage of drones can play an essential part in military strategy.

51
52

Roger Barnett, “Asymmetric warfare: Today’s Challenges to US Military Power,” 2002
Ibid.
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A larger with issue with IHL and drones is determining whether or not the people
who are living in areas where they are used in the Middle East are living in conflict
zones. If the level of violence caused by Al-Qaeda and their affiliates constitutes a
conflict zone, then the group can be classified as combatants who can be targeted, making
approved U.S. targeted attacks against them are perfectly legal.53 However, if terrorists in
Yemen and Pakistan are not combatants in an armed conflict, then to target and kill them
extra judicially would be a war crime worthy of international examination in a criminal
court.54
It is obvious that terrorists cause violence, but the international legal definition of
combatants is more expansive than sporadic acts of terror. Certainly in Afghanistan, a
state in which the U.S. has officially declared a war against Al-Qaeda operatives,
civilians there are living in an armed conflict and are therefore protected by International
Humanitarian Law.55 However, the incidents of terrorism in Pakistan, Yemen, and even
Somalia all vary in intensity and frequency. The International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia deemed an armed conflict to exist between a state and an organized
group featuring protracted violence.56 However, the organization of Al-Qaeda has been
largely dismantled, breaking down its structure and centralized organization.
Autonomous groups have sprung up, identifying themselves as being part of Al-Qaeda,

53

Alexandre Vautravers, Interview with Author, October 30, 2013.
Akbar Nasir Khan, “Legality of Targeted Killings by Drone Attacks in Pakistan,” Pakistan Institute for
Peace Studies. February 2011.
55 Susan Breau, Marie Aronsson, and Rachel Joyce, “Discussion Paper 2: Drone Attacks, International
Law, and the Recording for Civilian Casualties of Armed Conflict,” Oxford Research Group. June 2011.
56 Helen Duffy, “The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law,” (2005).
54

18

19
which does not exist as a hierarchical organization with centralized control over all of
these groups anymore.57
The Taliban is a different example. The Northwestern territories of Waziristan in
Pakistan can be recognized as a non-international conflict zone.58 This is the area largely
under the control of the Taliban and is experiencing frequent and contracted violence.59
Yemen and the rest of Pakistan, though violent and unstable areas, do not seem yet to
meet this constitution. The ongoing security concerns in Yemen can be traced to four
separate local entities each fighting for a different cause, in a different region, though
often economically motivated.60 This would point away from the definition of an
organized structure committing contracted violence. However, these conclusions are far
from final, and fostering international discussion over more what more specifically
constitutes a conflict zone is needed. If Yemen and Pakistan are not conflict zones, then
the only way to enforce counterterrorism is through the governments in place there, the
ramifications of which are discussed later.
Even in the view that Yemen and the entirety of Pakistan are areas of conflict, and
therefore covered by IHL, one issue that immediately arises with the use of drones is the
process by which combatants have been identified from civilians. Civilians are defined in
a negative sense as not being combatants. Combatants are defined as members of armed
groups taking a direct part in hostilities.61 It is legal to target those deemed to be
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“License to Kill: Why the American Drone War on Yemen Violates International Law,” Al Karama.
October 17, 2013.
58 Susan Breau, Marie Aronsson, and Rachel Joyce, “Discussion Paper 2: Drone Attacks, International
Law, and the Recording for Civilian Casualties of Armed Conflict,” Oxford Research Group. June 2011.
59 Ibid.
60 Alexandra Lewis, “Violence in Yemen: Thinking About Violence in Fragile States Beyond the Confines
of Conflict and Terrorism,” Stability: International Journal of Security & Development. May 14, 2013.
61 “Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda” Human Rights Watch. October 2013.
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combatants or other military personnel during a time of conflict, as long as the rules of
proportionality apply.62 Civilians, on the other hand, are never allowed to be targeted in
times of peace or war. In attacks that may involve the death of civilians to bring about
combatant deaths or other strategic measures, the rules of proportionality and precaution
work to strike a balance between military necessity and humanity.63 This provision
allows for much situational interpretation.
In the case of drone policy, this interpretation is much looser than it ought to be.
The practice for determining the identities of targets as either combatants or civilians is
especially legally dubious in the use of signature strikes.64 This has an interesting root in
traditional warfare. Before the advent of targeted killing, it was common practice to open
fire on those in Nazi uniforms in World War II and the Vietcong in Vietnam.65 Al-Qaeda
is not physically distinguishable from civilians. Though signature strikes have killed
leaders unexpectedly who just happened to be there, they are highly contentious under
IHL. Opening fire on a group of people who look like terrorists--or under the U.S.
standards, a military aged man—is most certainly in violation with the principle of
distinction.
Another pertinent caveat is that of the Hague Regulations of 1907, which made
targeting a combatant who had laid down their weapon or surrendered a war crime.66 Of
course, there is no chance of surrender with drones, as death happens in seconds from
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Nils Melzer, “Human Rights Implications of the Usage of Drones and Unmanned Robots in Warfare,”
Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, as Requested by the European Parliament. May
2013.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Daniel Byman, “Why Drones Work,” Foreign Affairs, Jul/Aug2013, Vol. 92 Issue 4.
66 Nils Melzer, “Targeted killing in international law,” (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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above.67 The opportunity for surrender, unlike due process, is still a right that is afforded
to combatants,68 so regardless of how terrorist groups in Pakistan and Yemen are
classified, they ought to have the opportunity to surrender to prevent what could be called
indiscriminate killings. This does not mean that given the opportunity, every combatant
would surrender. It doesn’t even mean any of them have to. However, killing suspected
terrorists without any chance for defense, while not a blatant violation of this regulation,
certainly does not pass it with flying ethical muster.69
In short, while the principles of IHL still ought to be regarded as good guides for
appropriate behavior in warfare, there is discord over whether the United States has any
obligation to follow these and the Geneva Conventions in the situation of drones. That
still does not jettison their actions into a realm of legal vacuum. Whether or not the
terrorists acts in these regions constitute conflicts, in its attacks, the United States
certainly must follow the conventions of human rights.
This leads to the second body of law to consider, International Human Rights
Law, which applies to the protection of human rights universally both in times in conflict
and peace.70 IHRL regulates the proportionality of killings as well as the duty to
minimize harm.71 The use of force is to be used as a last resort, when capture is not
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possible and an imminent threat is posed. These laws can be deviated from only in a time
of immediate crisis, when the life of a state is threatened.72
Here is where the argument inevitably turns more subjective if for no other reason
than a lack of information. John Brennan contends that there were zero collateral
casualties in 2011.73 Of course, the practice of counting all military-aged men as
operatives casts doubt on that claim.74 The Government of the United States officially has
acknowledged 4,70075 deaths as a result of drones, although the location of the targets as
well as their status as combatants is unclear. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism
estimates that in Pakistan, anywhere from 2,065-3,613 combatants have been killed, as
well as anywhere from 153-926 civilians in 348-374 strikes.76 Human Rights Watch
released a report this year that took a look at these numbers in Yemen, where an
estimated 80 attacks have happened since the drone program was reinstated in 2009.77
The report considers only six of these attacks, which resulted in 82 casualties, 57 of
whom were civilians.78 Although these six cases represent only a small portion of the
whole, there is something clearly indiscriminate about a civilian casualty rate of 70%.
Regardless of whether the laws of IHL apply to these indiscretions, the rules of
IHRL certainly cover the same jurisdiction for the discrepancies in casualties.79 The two
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legal bodies work together to cover these gaps that may occur, in this case, with the
involvement of non-state actors and sporadic violence. This is important because it
determines the forum for discussion as well as punitive measures that can be taken. If
outcry by civil society for U.S. reporting of casualties becomes widespread enough, three
things can happen. In the first situation, the actions by the U.S. in at least some of their
targeted killings are deemed egregious and crimes against humanity. Then, monetary and
political reparations are paid to the families of the victims, and drones move towards
becoming a more carefully regulated weapon. In the second, and less likely scenario, the
use of drones by the U.S. in these examples is deemed to be within their legal bounds,
and nothing changes in the use of drones except perhaps slightly more accountability.
It is the third route that is the most legally confounding. One major part of these
bodies of law is the idea of consent. If it is the case that the violence only concerns the
imminent security of Yemen and not the U.S., then the U.S. would have no legal grounds
for any targeted killing in Yemen short of government permission.80 If a country has the
consent of another state’s government to intervene in that state, it is legitimate.81 This is
problematic for the issue of drones because it is officially ambiguous if the United States
has permission from the governments of Pakistan and Yemen to operate on their
territories in taking out terrorist operatives. The government of Pakistan has been open in
condemning the involvement of Americans, especially in the widely unpopular use of
drone strikes, which only 17% of the population supported in June of 2012.82 Contrary to
these claims, prominent American news sources including The New York Times and The
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Washington Post have published numerous articles stating in no unclear language that the
governments of Pakistan and Yemen both have agreements that allow the United States
to operate drones over their territories.83
This is one of the reasons such ambiguity exists on the legal interpretations of the
drone policy of the United States, because little to no official information is available to
the public on how they are planned or carried out. The U.S. first acknowledged that it
was even carrying out direct strikes in Yemen in 2012, 10 years after the first strike there
and 3 years after the program had been re-vamped.84 Even then, this acknowledgment by
the U.S. mentioned only direct action taken by the military, not the CIA who were in
charge of the drone strikes at the time.85
What this lack of transparency means on a larger scale is that it serves as a
method to thwart public debate as well as to enshrine a covert government operation.
Because NGO’s are not aware of the mechanisms in place to determine when and against
whom targeted killings are launched, there can be no debate over their effectiveness or
legality. This leads to discord within a civil society movement that ought to be unified in
order to bring about the legal action they desire. Some organizations like Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch take a more conservative route and advocate only
for better accountability before making further judgments on the drone program as a
whole.86 On the other hand, UN Special Rapporteur Christof Heyns87 and Middle Eastern
advocacy groups like Al Karama, HOOD, and The Pakistan Institute for Peace push for
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more hardline international disapproval, arguing that not only does IHL not apply, but
even if it did, most strikes would be illegal.88
One side being right in this argument does not signify the incorrectness of the
other. What is at stake is the efficiency and effectiveness of the discourse that needs to
take place in agreeing on an acceptable usage of drones. If this second school of thought
is correct, the lack of transparency decried by the first becomes even more problematic.
As time moves on and the current practice of targeted killing continues largely
unopposed between world powers, the less likely it is that those practices will change
simply because more states will begin using the technology in the precedent that is now
being set. And if this second school of thought is correct, and the way the majority of
current drone strikes are being carried out is illegal. That sets an incredibly dangerous
precedent of use for the rest of the world, all the while, keeping the military and
executive processes behind closed doors.
Outside of violations within IHL and IHRL, the third looming question is over the
legality of the United State’s intervention in Pakistan and Yemen in the first place. The
right of a country to wage war and intervene on another state’s territory, Jus Ad Bellum,
originates from the UN Charter.89 The international justification for war lays in Article 51
of the Charter, which authorizes forces as a means of self-defense against an imminent
threat.90 Whether or not twelve years after the September 11th attacks, Al-Qaeda and its
affiliates are still a direct and imminent threat to the security of the United States is
unclear. Not since the writing of the original UN Charter has a rebel group incited a
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quasi-global war such as the one unfolding throughout the Middle East. Since no
precedent exists for waging such a war, the United States taking action is a way of
forming their own unilateral legal interpretation.91 With the disposal of many of the
world’s forefront legal experts, the United States has formulated a hardline defense of
their war against Al-Qaeda, vehemently arguing for their need for self-defense. This does
not make it an infallible position. Major human rights groups, including Human Rights
Watch and Amnesty International, call into question the extent that violence in the states
of Yemen and Pakistan that actually affects the U.S. instead of just those country’s
autonomous governments.92
If the original intervention of the United States does pass legal standards, perhaps
that only suggests shortcomings not of the international laws, but of the United States’
most recent interpretations of them.93 One of the largest issues is the position this has put
the United States in as acting internationally however they deem to be acceptable without
much concern for global approval. In taking direct action, the U.S. has already put into
play military and executive interpretations of the laws of war that may or may not be
legal. These interpretations and specifically the decision to use targeted killings, though
difficult to decipher their final consequences, are an example of the complexity that
comes with working out international law in the changing face of warfare. Despite these
legal and ethical questions that come with the policies of targeted killing, to go through a
more traditional legal route may have proven to be more difficult challenging in
achieving their end goals.
91

Mohammad-Mahmoud Mohamedou, interview by author, November 7, 2013.
“Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda” Human Rights Watch. October 2013.
93 Nils Melzer, “Human Rights Implications of the Usage of Drones and Unmanned Robots in Warfare,”
Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, as Requested by the European Parliament. May
2013.
92

26

27
If the United States had deemed that the threats against their national security
were not urgent enough to wage a war, their course of action would have proven to be
convoluted to say the least. If the threat of Al-Qaeda was not deemed imminent,
cooperation through the state governments of Pakistan and Yemen would have be
necessary. This would have dictated a state of law enforcement cooperation with the
home countries, not military action.94 Of course, in Pakistan, and especially Yemen, the
governments in place have little to no law enforcement power over the terrorist groups
that reside there, one of the main problems that allowed for the rise of terrorist
organizations in these regions in the first place. Both country’s political systems are
different, but it important to understand their shortcomings to see both how terrorists
gained such influence over them and why the military response of drones, even if legally
executed, can only cover a small portion of the issues currently facing Yemen and
Pakistan.
Why Drone Policy Is Incomplete
The increase of American interest in Yemen in 2009 is no coincidence. Al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), currently identified by the U.S. as its most dangerous
current incarnation, officially announced its existence early in that year.95 Even before
this declaration, Yemen has existed in a protracted state of instability, with civil wars in
1994 and 2011.96 Pakistan is a different example. The most imminent threat in Pakistan
remains the Taliban, who have occupied much of the border region of the country since
94

Thomas Michael McDonnell, “Sow what you reap? Using predator and reaper drones to carry out
assassinations or targeted killings of suspected Islamic terrorists,” George Washington International Law
Review 44, no. 2 (2012).
95 “License to Kill: Why the American Drone War on Yemen Violates International Law,” Al Karama.
October 17, 2013.
96 Alexandra Lewis, “Violence in Yemen: Thinking About Violence in Fragile States Beyond the Confines
of Conflict and Terrorism,” Stability: International Journal of Security & Development. May 14, 2013.

27

28
2001.97 These regions occupied by terrorist organizations are ones with weak jurisdiction
that are also physically difficult to reach and to patrol. Because of the situation, drones
may seem a reasonable military strategy, debate over their usage aside. The infrastructure
does not exist to send domestic troops into these areas to properly tackle the issues facing
them.98 That has created a seemingly better alternative of reliance on drones that has left
other options unexplored. Unlike state building, which proved to be a failure when
attempted in Iraq, targeted military killings are a strategy the United States both
understands and can execute with efficiency.99 It can be seen in the light of the analogy of
the hammer and nail, where to those who hold the hammer, everything looks like a nail.
However, despite years of deploying military force against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda,
problems continually persist with terrorism in the Middle East, meaning it may be time
for the United States to utilize a different toolbox.
One of the signs that the continued military action in fighting terrorism has
become ineffective is the growing disdain for it in Pakistan and Yemen. A 2012 Pew
survey estimates that around 74% of Pakistanis view the U.S. as the enemy.100 This
should cast severe doubt on the methods the U.S. is currently employing in Pakistan,
which of course calls into question its counterterrorism policy as a whole. At the same
time, from a military perspective, it is impossible to imagine a successful policy that does
not include taking out the key strategic terrorist leaders.101 Because this balance has been
so misconstrued through civilian casualties and a lack of information, the public opinion
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has turned against the United States in a way that is both immensely problematic and at
the same time nearly impossible to fix.102 The issue stems from the United States’ own
secrecy, but is then propagated through the local governments and even now at a national
level by the governments, especially of Pakistan. At this point in time, in both Yemen and
Pakistan, there is a widespread belief that the current methods used for fighting terrorism
serve only to create more terrorists.103
Here is one anecdotal example to illustrate this idea in action.104 Take a man
killed in a drone strike, either civilian or combatant. In Yemen, a country where
polygamy is legal, this leaves possibly multiple wives and young children without any
method at all to support themselves. No state relief exists to aid them, so if a group like
Al-Qaeda steps into that void to fulfill those needs, that have created a whole small
network of supporters. This example does not necessarily mean the U.S. should step in
and support the widows and children of people they have deemed to be terrorists, but it
goes to illustrate just how void Yemen is of government influence, and how the uprooting
of AQAP is much more difficult than simply killing off their leaders.
To stop terrorism at its roots is a much deeper social project, but because of the
current failure of military efforts, attention should be shifted to the underlying problems
that targeted killings only exacerbate instead of cure. As shown in the example above, the
reason terrorism is growing is two-pronged. The first thing to understand is why these
terrorist organizations are still gaining support from the people, especially in Yemen.105
There, the group is not seen as a political one, and their popular support does not come
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from the desire for them to take over the government.106 Instead, AQAP gains interest
because they are viewed as the only viable alternative to the Western influences. Many
Al-Qaeda operatives were prominent people in villages and society before joining the
group, a factor that lends itself to popular support and helps propagate the position that
Al-Qaeda is the only option for defense against imperial powers like Saudi Arabia and
the United States.107 For the people to who drones are an early death constantly flying
above, there are very choices for defense besides the continued support of terrorist
groups.
The other reason AQAP has continued to rise in prominence despite drone attacks
is the lack of state that allowed it to form so strongly in the first place.108 There are still
vast problems of underdevelopment and absence of state in South Yemen, which has
been plagued by decades of civil war.109 In Al-Qaeda, there is a chance for security for
those who the state is unable to reach or does not have the power to. In this way,
terrorism becomes a vicious cycle of rising from state destabilization, and then through
recruitment and promises made on fixing failing governments, further causes a
decentralization of the state. This cycle, made worse by the current drone policy, also
works to thwart the U.S.’s interests in creating a democratic state. If the drone policy
continues, popular opinion shows no signs of changing favorably for the U.S. If popular
opinion continues against the U.S., eventually elected leaders will reflect the people’s
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will, creating more of an issue of a valid state government selected by the people who are
opposed to American interests.110
Again, how is it possible to stop this cycle? Military action has reached a state of
being counterproductive, but when weighed against the deeper issues in Yemen and
Pakistan, other options can seem to be a futile undertaking. One suggestion is the idea of
negotiation with AQAP, which has traditionally been seen as negative in giving
recognition and authenticity to groups whose existence is threatening. However, in
negotiating, terrorist organizations may have more at stake than the U.S. Historically,
groups like the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and even the Muslim Brotherhood have had more
success and popular support when they were more radical and marginalized.111 By
attempting to bring them closer to the center and taking away their status as radical, AlQaeda groups will either be seen as less powerful, or if they refuse to negotiate, as more
part of the problem than the answer.112 Another issue that plays into the radicalization of
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban is the targeting of their leadership. Although it is a necessary
step in destabilizing the groups, often less experienced and more radical members fill in
these positions.113 Though this may be an unavoidable side effect, it is still important to
note that radicalization will not be gotten rid of through targeted killing alone.
Another point to look into is the reallocation of funds. A Reaper drone costs, on
average, $12.5 million, on its own, not counting ammunition, pilots, intelligence,
surveillance, and data connections.114 In a state where many towns are still lacking roads
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and basic facilities, these numbers seem disproportionate. Instead, those resources could
be invested into longer-term projects, including improving education, infrastructure,
better native police training, and societal de-radicalization.115 The government of the U.S.
is already the largest global contributor to Yemen, donating more than $1 billion since
2007, about half of which was designated towards training.116 Saudi Arabia is another
partner in this effort117 and much of the actual training takes place there. The military
policies usually enrolled by Yemen and Pakistan involves questionable tactics at the best,
including torture, indiscriminate bombings, and scorched earth policies.118
Once again, the lack of infrastructure within Yemen makes it very difficult to
assess the amount this money has worked to change.119 That does not designate the
country as a black hole of investment. It does complicate even the most benevolent and
well-meaning investment strategies. As most changes happening from this money are still
taking root right now, it is difficult to determine just what the outcomes of the plans will
be. In the worst possible scenario, if another civil war were to happen, which is not
altogether unlikely, even in investing in well-meaning social projects like the training of
the police force, the U.S. could be seen as choosing sides and therefore alienating itself
further from the populations there.120
With even the best and most peaceful-seeming options given the possibility to
further unrest and destabilization, is there any hope for creating lasting security away
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from terrorist influence in Yemen and Pakistan? Concretely, it has yet to be seen. Drones
certainly have run their course in long-term usefulness as any further use would
constitute and even steepen the already massive amount of domestic disapproval for the
practice. Investments may not bring about significant enough change to keep warring
forces at bay and provide for the gaps and basic needs of the population. However, they
remain the best option moving forward. In empowering local groups and police forces
with proper training and tactics, the governments of Yemen and Pakistan can remain
preferable options to terror. If in the national mentality, the option of Al-Qaeda does not
provide for their needs as well as the current government does, the group’s popular
support will wane.121 If drones continually attack and reforms seem far off and
ineffective, the issues that create terrorism will only worsen.
Geopolitics
The last thing to consider within the current use of drones is the relationship that
it is creating between countries. Already, there are debates across the U.S. about the
alleged relationship between the governments of Pakistan and Yemen in condoning U.S.
strikes over their territories, as previously mentioned. While the legal implications of this
were explored, it was left unopened as to why the government of Pakistan especially
would deny so strongly its cooperation with the U.S. It has been established that many of
the strikes were carried out in a way that was harmful to the reputation of the U.S., and it
is obvious why it would be against the interest of the governments of Pakistan and
Yemen to take even partial responsibility for a program that is widely unpopular. Also,
admitting the U.S. is responsible for strikes against terrorists under their jurisdiction has
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poor political implications. First of all, it becomes an open admission that they are not
powerful enough on their own to defend their states’ security interests from the
organizations residing there, further damaging their legitimacy.122 Even beyond
damaging their own projection of power, admitting to cooperation with the U.S. could
make them appear as a puppet government, operating only for Western interests and
completely undermining any claim they have of representing their own populations’
interests.123
As much as the governments of Yemen and Pakistan cannot afford to be
associated with the U.S. drone strikes as a result of how they’ve been carried out, they
also cannot afford to have terrorist organizations run wild in their territories, and lack the
military power alone to stop them.124 If the U.S. thinks these same groups are an
imminent threat and is willing to carry out the battle for them, what real choice does that
leave the governments of Yemen and Pakistan?
Although currently the U.S. is one of the few countries in the world that has the
capacity to utilize drone technology for targeted killings at such a long range,125 it must
be recognized that eventually this type of technology will spread. The affect that eventual
proliferation of drone technology will have on the relationship between states may be the
only real impetus to bring about change.126 To create a rudimentary drone is not difficult,
and could be done by states and non-state actors alike that the United States would prefer
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to not possess this capability, including Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas.127 It is already
reported that Iran has flown unmanned drones over Israel, which were promptly shot
down.128
The U.S. has reportedly sold drones to both France and Germany; allies whose
interests it is unlikely will clash with their own.129 This may actually serve in the benefit
of the U.S., taking international pressure off of their drone program as the only one
utilizing targeted killings. However, the culture of use in other countries that possess this
technology is much different from the U.S., and it is unlikely that France will utilize their
drones for anything other than surveillance before it is clear how the international
community will react to the practice of targeted killing.130 Europe, though it utilizes a
great deal of soft power, could potentially greatly benefit from the use of drones in its
militaries. As its leading countries are strong economically and technologically advanced,
the use of drones can plays into its perceived current military weakness and can serve as a
quick fix for national security and a greater stake in protection of its interests abroad. The
intervention in Libya in 2011 would be a good example of this use. The difficulty comes
in finding an acceptable use for the union as a whole when each country will inevitably
be divided on a policy as their security interests vary greatly.131
In the case of countries the U.S. is less inclined to work with, there are other
economic and technological powers, including possibly China and Russia, whose markets
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may cover that gap.132 Though much of this is still in the phase of speculation, it is
reasonable to assume that the same technology being utilized against Al-Qaeda may one
day be possessed by them. It may not be until that day comes that real legal change will
be enacted to improve regulations and transparency, but at that point it may be too late133.
Realizing the possibility that the tools of fighting terrorism can be turned around against
the U.S. is vital in inciting urgency in assessing the current procedures in place for the
operation of drones in targeted killing.
The last idea to look at, the one pervading every argument about the fairness of
targeted killing, is the idea that it is inherently unfair. Drone strikes have become the
ultimate reinforcement of the disparity in power between states.134 The United States
cannot be faulted for being the most technologically advanced country in the world when
it comes to its military. At the same time, this great divide between the distributions of
global power must be recognized as exacerbating anger against the faceless enemy the
United States has become in so many regions of Yemen and Pakistan through its use of
robots.135 Regardless of legal and even ethical arguments, in the scheme of globalization,
drones can be seen as another example of a careless expansion of Western power without
regard to the everyday lives of those living in countries that are less developed. The
policy of enacting whatever is to the greatest benefit to the U.S. and the U.S. alone must
be analyzed in order to fix so many of the root problems laying at the unrest and
inequality currently consuming countries like Yemen and Pakistan.
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Conclusion
There is a time and a place for drones, and for that reason, they are not going
anywhere. Used within the correct legal context of war, with proportionality and
discretion, it is possible to have a war focused on high-value targets alone, minimizing
civilian casualties. Unfortunately, the U.S.’s use of drones in greater Pakistan and Yemen
does not fall under this category. The high numbers, proportionally, of civilian casualties
would suggest that the vague lines of the Obama Administration’s criteria for selection of
targets have been crossed. This repeated action has created a toxic atmosphere in both
Pakistan and Yemen where any further use of drones will prove to be counterproductive
in the long-term, no matter the number of Taliban or Al-Qaeda operatives who are killed.
It is almost certain the United States is carrying out these attacks with the
permission of both the Pakistani and Yemeni governments. This does not justify this
policy. Instead, it avoids answering the question of the level of conflict in both countries
as to whether they constitute conflict zones. It also avoids answering the level of direct
danger that violence presents to the United States in determining their involvement in the
first place. In answering these two difficult questions, it would appear that the time for
U.S. military intervention against Al-Qaeda and its associates is nearly over, as the threat
level may no longer be imminent. As military action becomes counterproductive, it is
necessary to focus on tactics of local empowerment, law enforcement training, and the
building of infrastructure to strengthen the societies of Pakistan and Yemen instead of
working only to tear terrorist groups down.
Living in a world where a Noble Peace Prize winning President keeps a list of
operatives for remotely controlled aircraft to hunt and kill is unsettling. Even more
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unsettling is having an enemy country turn around and have the same policy. In order to
prevent this proliferation from happening in a dangerous cycle, accountability and
transparency need to happen now. Even if this President and his administration prove
trustworthy, there are many who will not. The time is now to put in place clear and
publically articulated guidelines for the use of drones. It is time to publish the exact
numbers of casualties of both combatants and civilians. Politics aside, it is essential to
recognize those mistakes made in civilian casualties, provide reparations for their
families, and endure necessary legal action that follows to make the world safer going
forward. It may prove to be a process both painful and embarrassing for the United
States, but given the alternatives, it is the only responsible course of action.
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